Abstract: The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by "Bayesian theories" I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of degrees of belief in the light of new evidence must be in accordance with some sort of conditionalization. The problems with the view I am criticizing can best be seen when we look at chains of inferences, rather than individual inferences. Chains of inferences have been neglected almost entirely within the new paradigm.
Introduction
The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, which developed over the past 20 years or so, "puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, represented as probabilities" (Elqayam & Over 2013, p. 249 ; see also Oaksford & Chater 2001; Oaksford & Chater 2007) . On the new paradigm, the attitudes involved in reasoning are seen as partial beliefs.
1 Hence, it can hardly be surprising that the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning is often seen as closely connected to Bayesian epistemology (e.g. Pfeifer & Douven 2014) . Indeed, many advocates of the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning want to use the Bayesian formal apparatus to model human reasoning. As Elqayam and Over (2012, p. 29) put it: "Approaches in the new paradigm vary widely, but what they share is a commitment to psychological principles which fit within a broadly Bayesian paradigm." Advocates of the new paradigm assume that a broadly Bayesian formal apparatus can be used to model human reasoning. In this paper, I will argue that this assumption is mistaken.
2 Some philosophers hold that Bayesianism is "a theory of consistent probabilistic reasoning [,… that] gives rise automatically to an account of valid probabilistic inference" (Howson & Urbach 2006, p. 301) . Such a view might suggest that Bayesianism tells us how agents without cognitive limitations should reason. And indeed, some advocates of the new paradigm psychology of reasoning think that some kind of Bayesian theory should be used as a normative standard for assessing human reasoning (Oaksford & Chater 1998, pp. 307-308) . Others hold that some version of Bayesianism is an adequate (or close enough) descriptive theory of the computational level of human reasoning (for references see Elqayam & Over 2012) .
In this paper, I argue that Bayesian theories are neither helpful normative theories for understanding human reasoning nor helpful descriptive theories because they cannot adequately describe or evaluate chains of inferences, i.e. series of inferences such that the conclusion of the first is a premise of the second and so on. For my present purposes, a "Bayesian theory" is one that holds 2 To get a first idea of what I have in mind, notice that the epistemological literature on subjective Bayesianism does not address the question what role, if any, partial beliefs play in human reasoning (see Staffel 2013, p. 3536) . Consequently, it is not clear what, if anything, Bayesian epistemology can tell us about reasoning. One might think that if that is right, then this is a problem for Bayesianism -and not only for the new paradigm psychology of reasoning. Suppose, for example, that we should "avoid talk about knowledge and acceptance of hypotheses, trying to make do with graded belief" (Jeffrey 1970, p. 183 ; see also Maher 1993, pp. 152-55 ) -as some Bayesian epistemologists claim we should. Then we would need an account of the rationality of reasoning with partial beliefs, if we want an account of rational reasoning at all. As John Broome has recently put it: "Bayesians owe us an account of the active reasoning processes by which you can bring yourself to satisfy Bayesian requirements" (Broome 2013, p. 208) . However, I want to put the question whether it is a problem for Bayesianism that it has little to say about reasoning to one side. Whether or not it is a problem for Bayesianism, it surely is a problem for the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning.
(a) that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and (b) that rational update of a credal state in light of new evidence must be in accordance with some sort of conditionalization.
As I will argue, such theories cannot provide a computational-level account of (perfectly rational) chains of inferences. At best, they can give us necessary conditions for a chain of inference being rational, but it is unclear how anyone -even an agent with unlimited cognitive resources -could or would meet these conditions in forming a chain of inferences, i.e., it is unclear what computations are performed at the individual steps of such a chain.
Before I begin, I must forestall a potential misunderstanding. The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning is often described as opposing a traditional paradigm that "anchored psychology of reasoning in classical, bivalent logic" (Elqayam & Over 2012, p. 28 
The New Paradigm and Degrees of Belief
Let me begin by describing how degrees of belief are used within the new paradigm and what might have led advocates of the new paradigm astray. As I will argue below, the inadequacy of a Bayesian formal apparatus for modeling human reasoning comes out clearest when we look at chains of inferences, i.e. cases in which first a conclusion is drawn from some premises and then this conclusion is used as a premise (and hence as an input) in another inference and so on.
Chains of inferences are, however, not discussed in the literature within the new paradigm.
Both, theoretical discussions and empirical studies, focus exclusively on cases of single-step inferences.
On the side of theoretical discussion, recent overviews, reviews and critical discussions of the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning do not mention chains of inferences (see On the side of empirical studies, research also seems to focus exclusively on single-step inferences. In a typical experiment, e.g., Oaksford, Chater and Larkin (2000) presented subjects with different scenarios that put constraints on the distribution of symbols on cards; they then asked subjects to either rate how likely it is that a certain prediction about the symbols on the cards is correct or to rate the acceptability of a conclusion about the cards given certain premises.
These ratings are then taken to reflect the degree of belief the subject has in the conclusion (given the premises). The study was designed to compare four different kinds of single-step inference that subjects could make: modus ponens, modus tollens, denying the antecedent, and affirming the consequent. The same is true of other empirical investigations of such inferences (e.g. Singmann, Klauer, & Over 2014) . Questions about chains of inferences do not arise in the context of such studies. The same holds for Chater and Oaksfords (1999) account of syllogistic reasoning. They gave subjects two premises and four possible conclusions, and subjects have to tick a box next to the conclusions they think follow from the two premises. Here again Chater and Oaksfords only discuss single-step inferences, and they do so in terms of the notion of pvalidity that I shall discuss below.
Similarly, Oaksford and Chater (1994) Here is an example of the task: Four cards are lying in front of you. Printed on them you see "A", "K", "2", and "7", respectively. Each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. You are then given the statement "If there is a vowel on one side, then there is an even number on the other side"; you must then select those cards that you must turn over to determine whether the statement is true of false.
paradigm could have overlooked the problem I will be raising below. This does not, however, make the problem any less pressing.
It is worth pointing out that chains of inferences can be, and have been, investigated using 
Chains of Inferences with Degrees of Belief
We often make inferences from premises that are themselves the conclusions of earlier inferences. In mathematics, e.g., we may first infer a lemma from some axioms and then infer a theorem from the lemma. We can also reason in this way about matters that involve uncertainty or in non-monotonic ways, e.g., about our moral obligations (an area where hardly any inference is monotonic). Thus, human reasoning often proceeds stepwise; we often reason by stringing together chains of inferences.
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Given the ubiquity of chains of inferences, any theory of 4 Thanks to an anonymous referee for alerting me to this work. 5 I am not sure whether a process by which an entire credal state changes at once should be called "inference." However, even if it is not necessary, it is true that we can reason by forming chains of inferences. By doing philosophy or mathematics anyone can generate examples for her own case. It is easy to find examples that concerns empirical, non-necessary facts that can only be known a posteriori. (iii) Chains of inferences can be entirely rational and correct. In mathematics, e.g., we
can form chains of inferences that are entirely rational and correct. Hence, the account shouldn't make chains of inferences as such irrational; there must be a correct way of forming such chains. E, S first infers P from E (i.e. S inferentially adjusts her credence in P), and then infers Q from P (i.e. S inferentially adjusts her credence in Q). This is a chain of inferences. Let us represent the three credal states of S, i.e. the one before the inference, the one after the first step, and the one after the second step, by Prold, Prstep1, and Prstep2 respectively. What can a Bayesian theory tell us about it?
View 1: All that a Bayesian theory can and should tell us is that if S's reasoning is rational, then the values of her new partial beliefs in P and Q equal the probabilities assigned to P and Q in a probability function that is the result of conditionalizing the probability function that characterizes S's old credal state on E (or adjusting this function to a change in the partial belief in E, e.g., via Jeffrey Conditionalization).
View 2: If S's reasoning is rational, each step in the chain of inferences happens by some computational process that can be thought of as a kind of "conditionalization" that operates on just a single partial belief -not a whole probability function at once. Let's call this computational process "stepwise-conditionalization." S first stepwise-conditionalizes P on E; S thereby arrives at a new partial belief in P. This is the first inference in the chain. Next, S stepwise-conditionalizes Q on P -using her new partial belief in P. S thereby arrives at a new partial belief in Q. This is the second inference in the chain. These seem to be the most plausible views on the matter, given a commitment to a "broadly Bayesian paradigm" in the psychology of reasoning. For what it is worth, I cannot see a fourth view that seems plausible (I will return to this issue in Section 6). In the remainder of this paper, I shall argue that on none of these three views, Bayesian theories provide a computational-level account for describing or evaluating chains of inferences. In the following three sections, I will address these three views in turn.
View 1
On View 1, all we get from Bayesian theories when it comes to chains of inferences is a necessary condition on the partial beliefs that are generated in such chains: their values must coincide with the values we would get by conditionalizing the whole credal state on E. Now, familiar kinds of conditionalization are operations on entire credal states "at once;" it is not clear what it would mean to perform a conditionalization operation in steps that could match the steps in a chain of inferences. Hence, the computation underlying the steps in a rational chain of inferences cannot be any familiar kind of conditionalization. Adopting a distinction due to Herbert Simon (1976) , we might say that, on View 1, conditionalization provides merely a constraint on "substantive rationality" and does not tell us anything about "procedural rationality." This means that, on View 1, Bayesian theories don't tell us what computations are performed at each step in a chain of (rational) inferences -at least after the first step.
Let us look at a possible motivation for View 1 in a bit more detail, which will also foreshadow the discussion of View 2 below. What could Bayesianism tell us about the computations at issue? Perhaps the computation performed in the first step from E to P is the calculation of the value of the conditional probability of P given E, i.e. Prold(P|E), given the old credal state of S, i.e. Prold(P&E) divided by Prold(E) -or something the like, e.g., a computation of the new value of the partial belief in P according to Jeffery Conditionalization. However, after the first step, the function computed in the second step must yield Prold(Q|E) when given the new partial belief in P, i.e. Prold(P|E), as input (or the analogs of these for Jeffery Conditionalization). Bayesianism gives us no clue as to how such a function may be computed.
In particular, it is utterly unclear what role the new partial belief in P could play in this computation. Of course, S might compute Prold(Q|E) just as she computed Prold(P|E), but S's updated partial belief in P would not play any role in this computation. Thus, it would be wrong to speak of a chain of reasoning here; S would perform a number of independent computations.
There would be no sense in which the result of the first step is used as an input to the second step. One might think that this is still the right view. Perhaps Bayesianism is merely a theory of substantive rationality. Perhaps it is silent on norms governing and computations underlying chains of inferences. In any event, we have seen that even if such a view is correct, it cannot support the ideas behind the new paradigm.
View 2
On View 2, there is some computational process that is at the same time a stepwise procedure and some sort or variant of conditionalization, adjusted so as to operate on individual credences
and not on whole probability functions. Perhaps this is the kind of view Ralph Wedgwood has in mind when he writes:
More precisely, I suggest, your […] credences are not only disposed to be probabilistically coherent; they are also disposed to change in response to experience, and the changes dictated by experience are propagated throughout the whole set of credences by means of some kind of conditionalization. These are the only kinds of changes in one's […] credences that are involved in these […] credences' essential functional role. (Wedgwood 2012, p. 320) On this view, changes of partial beliefs can be "propagated throughout the whole" credal state "by means of some kind of conditionalization." This suggests that there is a stepwise computation that is "some kind of conditionalization" and whose steps correspond to the steps in a chain of inferences. Let's call this computation "stepwise-conditionalization," to distinguish it from the familiar kinds of conditionalization that operate globally on a whole credal state "at once." It is not clear that the idea of such an operation makes sense, but let us assume that it does. The idea is that S first stepwise-conditionalizes her partial belief in P on E and then uses her new partial belief in P in a second stepwise-conditionalization of Q on P. What should the transitions from Prold to Prstep1, and from there to Prstep2 look like, on this view?
A natural suggestion is that stepwise-conditionalization is a computation that yields the conditional probability of, e.g., P given E in S's old credal state and sets the value of S's new partial belief in P to the value of this conditional probability. If we work with simple conditional 
probabilities, this would mean that Prstep1(P)=Prold(P|E)=Prold(P&E)/Prold(E). It seems plausible that Prstep2(P)=Prstep1(P). After all, S has already adjusted her credence in

Prstep2(Q)=Prold(Q|E) does not always hold.
Here is a counterexample. Let
Prstep1(P) = Prold(P|E)=.4, and let Prold(E) =.5, Prold(P&Q&E) = Prold(Q&P) =.1 and
Prold(Q&E) =.2. If we now use the old credence in Q&P to compute Prstep1(Q|P), we get
Prold ( The underlying problem is that calculating conditional probabilities is not and cannot be transitive, which would be required in order to make the current proposal work. Indeed, on reflection, the whole idea seems absurd. If Prold(Q|E) equals the result of stepwiseconditionalizing P on E and then Q on the new partial belief in P, it must also be equal to the result of first stepwise-conditionalizing an arbitrary R on E and then Q on the new partial belief in R. After all, Prold(Q|E) is a definite value, given the probability function Prold. But surely what conclusions we can draw in the second step of a chain of inferences actually depends on the inference we made in the first step. In both, actual and completely rational human reasoning, it matters a lot what the first inference in a chain of inferences is. This complaint is independent of the specific way we calculate the particular values and of what we think the right version of conditionalization is.
The whole idea of calculating the results of conditionalization in a stepwise fashion that can form chains, i.e. where the result of the first computation is used as input to the second and so on, simply does not make sense. We cannot mimic conditionalization by a "chain-forming computational process." There is no operation of "stepwise-conditionalization" by which we could compute the credences that would result from "all at once" conditionalization in a way that maps onto the steps in a chain of inferences. Hence, we cannot make sense of View 2; there is no coherent version of this view.
View 3
On View 3, there are two quite different computations involved in forming chains of inferences.
In our example, S first computes the value that conditionalizing her whole credal state on E would dictate for P; S then uses this new partial belief in P to arrive at a new partial belief in Q, 
Prold(P|E)×Pold(E) + Prold(P|~E)×Pold(~E).
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We now need a way of computing Prstep2(Q) from Prstep1(P). If Q happens to be ~P, the answer seems obvious: Prstep2(Q) must be 1-Prstep1(P). Can we generalize the idea behind this answer? The idea is that S's degree of belief in P dictates a degree of belief in ~P, on pain of probabilistic incoherence. So what we need would be something like inference rules that capture what probabilistic coherence dictates given some degrees of belief that are already adjusted in light of evidence E.
Recall that if we presuppose the ability to reason arithmetically, four axioms suffice to characterize the classical probability calculus. Here is a possible axiom set:
A2:
∀A (|=FOLA → Pr(A) = 1).
A3: ∀A∀B (Pr(A&B) = 0 → Pr(A˅B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B)).
A4: ∀A∀B (Pr(A&B) = Pr(A) × Pr(B|A))
If we assume that rational degrees of belief are "by nature," as it were, within the unit interval and that all theorems of first order logic have degree of belief 1 and all classical contradictions are believed to degree 0, it is straightforward to turn these axioms into rules of inference by considering all possible ways of exploiting A3 and A4. If we follow a suggestion by John Broome (2013, Chap. 10.4 ) and represent partial beliefs as the proposition followed by the degree to which it is believed -in the format "[Proposition P] (Cred: [degree of belief in P])" -, our axioms give rise to the following set of inference rules.
(1)
The rule that allows one to infer "~A (Cred: 1-n)" from "A (Cred: n)" can be derived from rule (2), given that A˅~A is believed to degree 1 and A&~A is believed to degree 0.
We can now put the pieces together. On the view under consideration, S computes Prstep1(P)
in accordance with a formula like Prold(P&E)/Prold(E), and in the second step of the chain S arrives at Prstep2(Q) by applying one of the rules (1)-(6). If all the partial beliefs S uses as premises when applying these rules are already adjusted in light of E, the resulting partial beliefs will equal the degrees of belief dictated by conditionalizing S's whole initial credal state on E.
Hence, these rules yield the right results, i.e. the results dictated by our preferred version of conditionalization.
Have we found a way of describing and evaluating chains of inferences in a "broadly Bayesian" framework? Unfortunately, there are at least two problems with this view -one minor and one major. The minor problem is that these rules are very "weak," i.e. you need a lot of already updated partial beliefs in order to derive interesting new partial beliefs. You need, e.g., three premises to conclude that A˅B (with some credence), while classical logic would, e.g., allow you to infer A˅B from A alone. This means that you need to start by applying the procedure of the first step (i.e. directly calculating individual degrees of belief dictated by your preferred version of conditionalization) to many partial beliefs; otherwise you do not have enough partial beliefs that you can use to trace out interesting consequences by using rules (1)-(6). However, rational chains of inferences do not seem to require that much input. Note that the issue is not that these rules require a lot of computational power.
Second, there is a major problem. The advocate of such an account must tell us what happens to all the partial beliefs that are neither updated in the first step nor (indirectly) via applications of rules (1)-(6). These partial beliefs cannot in general stay unchanged; for nothing would guarantee that the resulting credal state is probabilistically coherent -even if the reasoning is fully rational and correct and starts from a probabilistically coherent credal state.
After all, it seems implausible that fully rational and correct chains of inferences beginning with a probabilistically coherent credal state can lead to a probabilistically incoherent credal stateespecially given that on Bayesian theories (as defined above) all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent. However, it also seems highly undesirable to simply get rid of these credences (thus creating gaps in the probability function that characterizes the resulting credal state). Getting rid of these credences would mean that every time we learn something new, we lose every part of our view of the world that -as far as we can tell -has nothing to do with what we just learned. It seems that there is no way of guaranteeing that we arrive at a probabilistically coherent credal state (even when starting with one) by the two-phase process that we are envisaging.
Maybe we could use the process from the first step once more to fill-in the gaps in the resulting probability function. However, if that is an option, why did we use rules (1)- (6) in the first place? Why should anyone reason in a stepwise fashion if she could simply apply conditionalization to her whole credal state, or at least arbitrarily large parts of it, all at once?
Surely, we sometimes have to form chains of inferences -even fully rational and correct ones -because we cannot adjust arbitrary large parts of our credal state by some operation like conditionalization.
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An opponent might reply to the minor problem by providing a system of stronger inference rules. In fact, the considerations I mentioned motivated some authors to come up with stronger "probability logics," which they want to use to model human reasoning within the new paradigm (e.g. Pfeifer 2013; Pfeifer & Kleiter 2006) . In order to allow for stronger inferences, such logics work with interval-valued credences, instead of point-valued credences. We can think of these intervals as representing sets of (coherent) probability distributions, such that the agent is "undecided" between the distributions in the set. In such systems we have, for example, rules like the following-corresponding to versions of modus ponens, conjunction-introduction, and cut respectively (see Gilio 2012; Pfeifer & Kleiter 2006 ): A second problem is that these rules do not give us the interval-valued credences that we would get by (direct) conditionalization. The rules do not yield the right results. Here is an example using simple conditionalization: Suppose someone applies rule (7) with premiseattitudes that are already adjusted in light of the new evidence; yielding as conclusion-attitude a partial belief in B with the interval-value [x1x2, 1-x2+y1x2]. 10 Suppose furthermore that the updated degree of belief in A˅B, if the agent used conditionalization, would be [w, z] . Under these assumptions, the degree of belief in B after updating by conditionalization should be:
[x1x2+w-x2, x2y1+z-x2]. This equals [x1x2, 1-x2+y1x2] only if z=1 and w=x2 (which is the lowest value w can take, given x2). Therefore, if z<1 or w>x2, the result of applying rule (7) to arrive at a partial belief in B is not the same as the result of conditionalizing one's credence in B on one's evidence, i.e. the evidence one used to arrive at one's degree of belief in A and one's conditional degree of belief in B given A (i.e. the premise-attitudes of the inference under consideration).
This is unacceptable. If we used this method and updated a partial belief via conditionalization and later on also reasoned to this same proposition from some premises, we could get different results. This way of reasoning is not a way to adjust one's credal state in light of new evidence.
Rather, it is a way of figuring out what minimal conditions certain degrees of belief must meet if we pretend that all partial beliefs we are not considering take extreme values (within the constraints given by the degrees of belief we are considering). If we apply rules like (7)-(9), we do not in general arrive at the credal state that would be dictated by conditionalization.
To sum up, if we want to have a formal system that is reasonably strong and we hold on to the ideas that rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that some sort of conditionalization tells us what degrees of belief we ought to have in light of new evidence, we cannot accept View 3 as a computational-level account of fully rational chains of inferences.
The view does not guarantee that the credal states that result from such chains are probabilistically coherent -even if they begin with a probabilistically coherent credal state and are fully rational. Inference rules for point-valued degrees of belief are implausibly weak.
Moving to interval-valued degrees of belief does not help; it is in itself unattractive and does not yield the right results, i.e. degrees of belief underwritten by conditionalization. Therefore, View 3 is not a way of developing Bayesian theories into helpful normative or descriptive computational-level accounts of chains of inferences.
P-Validity: Another View?
Advocates of the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning often appeal to the notion of probabilistic validity (p-validity) as the successor concept to classical validity (see Elqayam & Over 2012; Over 2009; Oaksford & Chater 2007) . Following Adams (1998, pp. 131-132) an inference is defined to be p-valid just in case, for all uncertainty functions, the uncertainty of the conclusion is less or equal to the sum of the uncertainty of the premises, where an uncertainty function, u, is obtained from a probability function, Pr, by the principle that, for any proposition
Can we construct a computational-level account of chains of inferences by exploiting the notion of p-validity?
Notice that p-validity does not tell us what the degree of belief in the conclusion should be; it merely puts a lower bound on it. 11 Hence, p-validity does not settle what computations underlie fully rational inferences; by itself, it does not provide a computational-level account of fully rational inferences, let alone chains of inferences. As long as a computation yields a degree of belief above the lower bound set by p-validity, it is not ruled out as a candidate computation underlying a particular fully rational inference (see Adams 1998) .
How might one think about the computations underlying our ability to make p-valid inferences? There are at least two ways to think about them. First, one might hold that the partial belief in the conclusion that results from a rational inference is point-valued. In a fully rational inference, this point-value might either be settled by partial beliefs that do not occur in the premises or by some other mechanism. If the agent has partial beliefs that fix a unique degree of belief for the conclusion, on pain of probabilistic incoherence, it would be irrational for the agent to arrive at any other degree of belief in the conclusion. After all, that would make her credal state probabilistically incoherent. This would mean that these further partial beliefs must play a role in a rational inference to the conclusion. If all rational inferences are like that, the account reduces to the version of View 3 that uses rules (1)-(6) from the previous section. (With the only difference that some premises are not called "premises.") That view tried to squeeze an account of rational inference out of the notion of probabilistic coherence. If, on the other hand, the agent's partial beliefs do not settle a point-value for the degree of belief in the conclusion, the agent is either at liberty to adopt any degree of belief in the conclusion that does not make her credal state probabilistically incoherent or there is a general rule that settles which degree of belief within the allowed interval the agent should choose. On neither of these two options is the result of rationally revising one's credal state in light of new evidence settled by some sort of conditionalization. On such views, the degrees of belief in the last conclusion of a chain of inferences can be very different from what conditionalization would dictate. Thus, such views don't count as Bayesian theories, as I defined them in Section 1. Hence, if we understand the computations underlying rational p-valid inferences in this way, the view reduces to a version of View 3 or it is no longer a Bayesian theory in the sense defined above.
A second way of understanding the computations underlying the rational p-valid inferences is that they yield interval-valued degrees of belief. However, we have already seen in the discussion of View 3 that accounts based on interval-valued degrees of belief should be rejected.
In fact, the version of View 3 that appeals to rules like (7)- (9) is a late descendant of accounts based on p-validity (see Pfeifer & Kleiter 2009 ).
To sum up, the notion of p-validity does not provide the resources to construct an account that goes beyond those we have already considered. If we flesh it out so as to contain an account of the computational level of rational chains of inference, such an account collapses into a version of View 3.
Conclusion
I have argued that Bayesian theories, i.e. theories according to which rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and some sort of conditionalization settles what degrees of belief we ought to have in the light of new evidence, cannot be used to give an account of rational chains of inferences at the computational level of analysis. I conclude that the "wide consensus that
Bayesianism, at least in the broader sense, best captures the computational level of analysis of the new paradigm" (Elqayam & Over 2012, p. 28 ) must rest on a mistake. Or else it rests on an understanding of Bayesianism that is significantly broader than the notion of "Bayesian theories" I used in this paper. However, on such a broad or "soft" sense of "Bayesianism," the role of the probability calculus, Dutch Book arguments, and rules of conditionalization is difficult to make out. It is not just that their role in describing actual chains of inferences by humans is unclear;
their role in a computational account of rationally ideal chains of inferences is unclear. I don't know what the meaning of "Bayesianism" on such a broad "understanding" of the term could be.
In any event, such an account would have little to do with Bayesian epistemology.
Given all this, it is difficult to see what role Bayesian theories can play in the psychology of reasoning. Thus, when Elqayam and Over (2012, p. 29) say that " [a] pproaches in the new paradigm vary widely, but what they share is a commitment to psychological principles which fit within a broadly Bayesian paradigm," it is unclear what these psychological principles might be.
Assuming that we should expect our epistemology to give an account of the rationality of reasoning -including chains of inferences -, one might conjecture that the inability of Bayesian theories to adequately describe or evaluate chains of inferences is not only a problem for the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning but also points to general limitations of Bayesian epistemology. This is a promising line of further research, I think.
